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Speech is power: speech is to persuade, to convert, to compel. It is
to bring another out of his bad sense into your good sense. (Ralph
Waldo Emerson, American essayist and poet, 1876).
The opportunity to communicate may be used in bargaining
situations to persuade the counterparty into accepting a particular
offer. Is such communication effective? The question especially applies
to simple interactions under complete information where any verbal
communication is viewed as cheap talk by traditional economic theory.
We study the effects of one-way communication by Proposers in
experimental ultimatum games (UG). A Proposer's message may
persuade a Responder to accept a certain offer and, if such persuasion
effects are anticipated, theProposermay also adapt the offer. Inparticular,
a Proposer may combine an expectedly persuasive message with asuitable offer in order to increase the expected payoff. We test the
hypothesis that persuasivemessages increase Proposers' averagepayoffs.
There are potentially confounding factors at play:messagesmay also
affect subjects' emotions and perceptions of economic outcomes. For
example, a Proposermay experience guiltwhenmaking a lowoffer, and
ﬁnd relief from sending an apology or explanation for the offer.
Alternatively, Proposersmay enjoy a positive self-imagewhenmaking a
high offer and such a feeling may be intensiﬁed by sending a friendly
message to the Responder. We refer to such effects as self-image effects.
In order to disentangle persuasion and self-image effects, we
propose an experimental design with three versions of the UG: a
standard UG without communication (treatment N) and two treat-
ments (BandA) inwhich theProposer can composea free formmessage
before submitting the offer. In treatment B the Responder sees the
message before deciding to accept, while in treatment A the Proposer
sees the message only after the acceptance decision is made. Thus,
persuasion effects are not present in treatment A and differences in
outcomes between treatments A and N can be attributed to self-image
effects. In contrast, differences between treatments B and N capture
both persuasion and self-image effects. We thus identify persuasion
effects comparing treatments B and A.
We ﬁnd that persuasion effects indeed led to an increase in
Proposers' payoffs. On average, Proposers' payoffs in treatment B were
Table 1
Proposers' payoffs across treatments.
Treatment Proposers' average payoffs Standard deviation
N 42.87 27.23
A 41.71 26.31
B 47.76 27.06
Table 2
Offers and acceptance rates across treatments.
Treatment N Treatment A Treatment B
Offer No. of
offers
Accept.
rate
No. of
offers
Accept.
rate
No. of
offers
Accept.
rate
10 1 0 1 1
20 1 1 1 1 2 1
25 1 1 2 0 1 1
30 9 0.55 7 0.43 8 0.63
32 1 0
35 3 0.33 4 0.5 5 0.4
40 8 0.63 7 0.86 9 0.78
45 3 1 2 1
50 11 1 13 1 11 1
55 1 1
56 1 1
60 1 1
Avg. offer/accept. rate 39.8 0.74 39.6 0.74 38.4 0.79
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bothhigher acceptance rates and lower offers. The persuasion effectwas
most pronounced in cases where subjects had experience of the game.
We do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant inﬂuence of self-image effects on
Proposers' offers.Moreover, using themessage evaluationmethodology
put forward in Xiao and Houser (2005), we ﬁnd that the majority of
messages in treatment B were classiﬁed as persuasive. Our data suggest
that subjects who sent persuasive messages received higher payoffs.
2. Previous experimental evidence
Communication in games has been analyzed earlier in the
experimental literature. Rankin (2003) used a UG in which the
Responder could request an amount of money before the Proposer
made his offer. Rankin found that average offers and Responders'
payoffs were lower in the treatment where requests were possible.
The results by Rankin (2003) differ from the ﬁnding of a related
study by Xiao and Houser (2005), in which Responders in a UG were
given the opportunity to send messages along with their decisions to
accept or to reject the Proposers' offers. They found that this led to
signiﬁcantly lower rejection rates of unfair offers and observed that
people facing unfair economic exchanges could tend to substitute
emotion expression for relatively more costly material punishment.
The ﬁnding by Xiao and Houser (2005) has been complemented by
two further experimental studies. Xiao and Houser (2007) compared a
standard dictator game with one in which, after revelation of Dictators'
decisions, Receivers had the opportunity to write a message to their
respective Dictators. They found that proﬁt-maximizing offers were less
frequent when Responders had the opportunity to send messages.
In a related work, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) studied pair-
wise interactions in which a Dictator decided how to split a sum of
money between himself and a Receiver, who, thereafter, could send
an unrestricted message to the Dictator. They found that donations
increased substantially when Receivers could communicate: with
verbal feedback, the frequency of zero donations decreased from
about 40 to 20%, with a corresponding increase in the frequency of
equal splits from about 30 to 50%.
Our work may be seen as complementing the previous studies in
that we let Proposers, instead of Responders, communicate. The focus
of our study is on the role of persuasion rather than on the effects of
emotion expression of Responders. In the light of persuasion,
Proposers may have more to gain from communication since they
can plea for rationality in the form of subgame perfection.
3. Experimental design
We invited 76 students from Tilburg University to participate in
our experiment. Subjects were divided into 6 sessions, taking place in
CentERLab. Subjects were given aloud and written instructions of the
experiment.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were randomly
assigned the role of either Proposers or Responders. In each treatment
every Proposer was randomly matched with one different Responder.
The Proposer had to decide how many points X between 0 and 100
to offer to the Responder. The Responder then learned the Proposer's
offer and could either accept or reject it. In case of acceptance,
the Responder's payoff was X points, and the Proposer's payoff was
100−X points. In case of rejection, both subjects earned 0 point.
We employed three different treatments:
1. N (no communication): A standard UG without communication
2. B (Responder got message before her decision): The Proposer sent a
message together with the offer which the Responder read before
deciding to accept or to reject.
3. A (Responder got message after her decision): Like B, but the
Responder read the message after deciding to accept or reject.The experiment used a within design where all subjects in a session
played each of three different treatments at one time. Subjects knew in
advance that therewould be three different treatments and that in each
treatment theywere going to bematchedwith a different opponent, but
they did not know the content of the subsequent treatments in advance.
Moreover, subjects kept the same role of Proposer/Responder across all
three treatments. There was no feedback to Proposers during the
experiment: Proposers were informed about their Responders' deci-
sions in each treatment only at the end of the experiment. To control for
order effects, we employed a counterbalanced design containing the
following six sequenceswith different orderings of the treatments:NAB,
NBA, ANB, ABN, BNA, and BAN.
We designed and ran the experiment using z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). A show-up fee of 2.50€ was paid to subjects. In addition,
participants received their pay-out of one randomly drawn game
converted at a rate of 0.10€ per point. The 76 participating subjects
spent about half an hour in the lab and earned on average 6.60€ each.
4. Results
Table 1 shows Proposers' average payoffs in the three treatments.
In line with our hypothesis, average payoffs in treatment B were 14.5%
larger than in treatment A. Since payoffs strongly differed between
accepted and rejected offers, standard deviations were quite high,
however.
Within subjects, 15 of the 38 Proposers received higher payoffs in
treatment B than in treatment A, while only 6 Proposers had lower
payoffs; for 17 Proposers payoffs were the same. A one-sided sign test
conﬁrms the hypothesis of positive persuasion effects at a 95%
signiﬁcance level (p-value=0.039). The persuasion effect appears to
be driven by a combination of lower offers and increased acceptance
rates. Of the 15 Proposers who achieved higher payoffs in treatment B
than in treatment A, 9 made lower offers in treatment B. The
remaining 6 subjects made the same offer in both treatments, but this
offer was only accepted in treatment B.
The full distribution of offers and acceptance rates across
treatments is shown in Table 2. Average offers were slightly lower
and average acceptance rates were slightly higher in treatment B than
in both treatments A and N. In particular, for low offers, acceptance
rates were higher in treatment B. Treatments A and B display very
Table 3
Average Proposer proﬁts, offers and acceptance rates of experienced and inexperienced Proposers by treatment and message classiﬁcation.
Total No message Persuasion Apology Friendliness Other
Inexp Exp Inexp Exp Inexp Exp Inexp Exp Inexp Exp Inexp Exp
A Mean offer 39.2 39.8 40.6 40.0 47.0 35.0 30.0 50.0 41.7 27.5
Mean proﬁt 37.5 43.7 26.3 38.3 53.0 40.6 0.0 50.0 48.3 72.5
Accept 0.67 0.77 0.50 0.67 1 0.67 0 1 0.89 1
Messages 1 1 0.50 0.14 0.31 0.41 0.04 0.06 0.41 0.13
B Mean offer 38.8 38.3 41.3 36.0 36.7 36.2 30.0 50.0 50.0
Mean proﬁt 39.2 51.7 43.8 50.0 40.8 52.6 0.0 50.0 50.0
Accept 0.67 0.85 0.75 0.80 0.67 0.82 0 1 1
Messages 1 1 0.34 0.20 0.50 0.65 0.08 0.08 0.15
N Mean offer 38.9 40.2 38.8 40.3
Mean proﬁt 44.6 42.1 45.3 41.7
Accept 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.73
Messages 1 1 1 1
Note: The Inexp category contains inexperienced subjects in the ﬁrst round of the experiment while the Exp category contains the experienced subjects in rounds two and three of
the experiment. Acceptance denotes the fraction of accepted offers. Messages denotes the fraction of Proposers who sent messages of that category.
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presence of persuasion effects, while no systematic self-image effects
can be found.
4.1. Messages and experience effects
Despite the absence of information about Responders' behavior
between treatments, Proposers could in principle still gain experience
about the game. To address the effects of experience we divided our
data into two subsamples based on whether subjects had experience
of the game. We refer to subjects as inexperienced in the ﬁrst decision
round and as experienced thereafter.
We also gave a closer look at the content of the messages, following
the methodology in Xiao and Houser (2005). We invited 22 subjects
from Magdeburg University, Germany to independently classify the 56
messages into one of four categories: Persuasion, Friendliness, Apology or
Other. Evaluatorswere paid 5€ for showing up and could earn additional
10€ if their classiﬁcation matched the most common classiﬁcation for a
randomly drawn message.
For inexperienced and experienced subjects, Table 3 reports the
fraction of messages according to the most common message
classiﬁcation, and the corresponding average offers, proﬁts and
acceptance rates.1 The ﬁrst column reports results over all types of
messages. Experience did not seem to affect Proposers' proﬁts in
treatment N, while it did in the communication treatments. The effect
was especially strong in treatment B, in which average proﬁts for
inexperienced Proposers were 39.2 compared to 51.7 for experi-
enced.2, 3
Moreover, experienced subjects decided more often to send
messages to Responders in the communication treatments. The data
hence suggests an interaction between experience and the persuading
capability of Proposers. Further insights may come from the content of
the messages. Most messages in treatment B were classiﬁed as
persuasive while in treatment A, messages were more evenly1 There were no ties in the classiﬁcation of messages.
2 Within-subject comparison between treatments B and Awas not signiﬁcant for the
inexperienced group and borderline signiﬁcant (one-sided sign test p-value: 0.0592)
for the experienced group.
3 Another issue related to experience is whether Proposers made different offers
following treatment B. To address this issue we compared the offers in round 2 of
sessions with order ANB and NAB with sessions with order BAN and BNA. For session
ANB and NAB treatment B was last and the subjects in round 2 did not yet experience
it. For sessions BAN and BNA treatment B was ﬁrst and the subjects in round 2
therefore already experienced it. By only looking at round 2 data, the exposure to
treatment B was varied keeping the order in the sequence constant. Proposers' offer
following B was on average 40.4 compared to 37.7 for Proposers not having
experienced B. Hence, there was no clear effect on offers from having experienced
treatment B.distributed among friendly and persuasive messages. Moreover, in
treatment B the number of persuasive messages increased as subjects
got experienced. For experienced subjects, a persuasive message in
treatment B led to higher acceptance rates and average proﬁts than for
inexperienced subjects. Interestingly, offers between experienced and
inexperienced subjects were similar. Thus the observed increase in
proﬁts seemed to be due to the higher number and effectiveness of the
persuasive messages.4Acknowledgments
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